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        Safe Automated Driving Starts with Architecture


                                                                                  •  Sufficient independence evaluation.
                                                                                   A key challenge in AD architecture is
                                                                                   determining whether subsystems are
                                                                                   truly independent and can be treated
                                                                                   as distinct FCUs. The report will offer
                                                                                   a new scheme for assessing when such
                                                                                   independence can be deemed “suffi-
                                                                                   cient.” It looks to resolve one of the
                                                                                   most relevant conflicts in designing
                                                                                   AD systems: developing truly safe
                                                                                   architectures (which need sufficiently
                                                                                   independent subsystems) while creating
                                                                                   a cost-efficient solution using hardware
                                                                                   and software components of identical
                                                                                   type in the redundant channels. The
                                                                                   scheme addresses coupling factors
        Conceptual system architectures provide guidance on fault containment and redundancy   and the associated dependent failure
        management. (Source: TTTech Auto)                                          initiators. It then provides examples
                                                                                   of strategies to resolve each of them,
                                                                                   such as specific ways to prevent their
        architectures in three broad categories:   monitored by the Checker. If the Checker   root causes, control their effects, or
        monolithic, symmetric, and asymmetric:  considers the Doer’s output unsafe, it asks   reduce the coupling altogether. Finally,
          •  In monolithic architectures, just a single   the Selector to suppress it. If the Doer has   an Independence Metric is proposed to
           subsystem performs all tasks.    been silenced, the Fallback, which usually   assess the “independence coverage” of
          •  In symmetric architectures, multiple sub-  runs in hot standby, takes over and brings   resolution strategies, analogous to
           systems provide similar functionality.  the vehicle to a safe stop.     ISO 26262’s diagnostic coverage con-
          •  In asymmetric architectures, subsystems                               cept. Resolution strategies may need to
           can have different roles.        SNEAK PEEK: WHAT’S COMING IN THE       be combined to achieve high indepen-
          To evaluate and compare these conceptual   SECOND EDITION                dence coverage.
        system architectures, the Working Group   The Safety & Architecture Working Group   Architecture is not just an implemen-
        applied the concept of fault containment   continues its work. Since the release of the   tation detail; it is a central enabler of
        units (FCUs): Each subsystem is assumed   first report, new conceptual system architec-  safe automated driving. By focusing on
        to have defined failure modes that do not   tures have emerged, along with additional   conceptual system architectures, industry
        spread to other subsystems as long as inde-  industry examples that enable more com-  stakeholders can collaborate meaningfully
        pendence between them can be established.  prehensive comparisons. The upcoming   without compromising proprietary knowl-
          To achieve safety, a suitable architecture   second edition, scheduled for release at The   edge. The efforts of The Autonomous and
        must ensure that outputs of the AD system   Autonomous Main Event in September 2025,   its Safety & Architecture Working Group
        remain correct and available when an FCU   will feature two major updates:  highlight a practical way to design AD
        fails or performs inadequately. For high-  •  Expanded standards analysis. Beyond    systems that are not only intelligent but
        speed use cases, the system should continue   ISO 26262 and ISO 21448, the updated   inherently resilient. ■
        to react dynamically to the traffic situation.   report will examine how other safety
        Only in rare cases, such as simultaneous   standards, such as UNECE R157, UL 4600,   Georg Niedrist is a senior fellow and
        failures in multiple FCUs, might simpler   ISO/TS 5083, and the AI-focused    Technology & Innovation safety consultant;
        fallback actions such as “blind” braking be   ISO/PAS 8800 and ISO/IEC TR 5469, affect   Moritz Antlanger is a senior safety engineer;
        acceptable.                            the applicability of the various proposed   and Sascha Drenkelforth is principal safety
          The Working Group used a set of 13 qual-  architectures.              consultant, all at TTTech Auto.
        itative evaluation criteria clustered in six
        attributes to compare proposed conceptual
        system architectures. While monolithic and
        symmetric architectures are less well-suited
        for complex AD use cases, asymmetric
        architectures stood out for their robustness
        and efficiency. Because of their intrinsic
        diversity, they not only reduce the risk of
        common-cause faults but also can lower the
        implementation effort and cost by duplicat-
        ing only essential functionality.
          Asymmetric architectures often employ
        the Doer/Checker/Fallback combined
        architectural design pattern, ensuring
        both correctness and availability of the AD
        system. The Doer performs the nominal
        functionality and is usually in control of   Asymmetric architectures often employ the Doer/Checker/Fallback combined architectural
        the vehicle. Its output is independently   design pattern. (Source: TTTech Auto)

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